We have precious little time to stop Diebold from taking over our elections in California. On this Thanksgiving weekend, let's give thanks that it's not too late, that we haven't lost it all - like Ohio - YET.(This November, Ohio couldn't get badly-needed election reform propositions passed because Diebold now controls the vote in 44 of 88 counties. Polls showing a reform victory, once again, were called "erroneous.")
In California, however, there is cause for thanks. As you know...
On 11/21 in Sacramento, more than 125 Election Activists stood up for our right to vote and have our votes counted...accurately. (Read the report below this action alert - it will make you proud and very angry.)
We are battling Goliath. We must demonstrate that we are many Davids, and we will leave no stone unturned, or unhurled. And of course, we now have the overwhelming confirmation of the GAO report. (see below)
ACTION #1 The "right thing to do." It just takes a minute.
The California Secretary of State's office will "accept" public comment on the certification of the Diebold TSx touchscreen voting machine only until Monday, November 28th.
Tell Bruce McPherson we demand an extension of the HAVA Deadlines and a rejection of Diebold equipment. Send him the CEPN "Seven Reasons" to reject Diebold. (see below) Cite the letter written to Congress by the National Association of Counties (see below).
email your comments to votingsystemcomment@ss.ca.gov
Better: call (916) 653-6814 - press 6, then 3......
Recommended: FAX: 916 653-3214 Paper gets a LOT more attention.
WE CANNOT STOP THERE. WE ARE FIGHTING FOR THE LIFE OF OUR DEMOCRACY.
ACTION #2 CONTACT Your Local, State and DC Representative, ROVS, and County Supervisors.
Tell them you require their attention to this situation, or we all lose.
If you don't know your assemblyperson or California Senate Representative, look them up at:
http://www.assembly.ca.gov/acs/acsframeset9text.htm
Put in your zip code to find specific info.
Contact your local county supervisor. Look them up in the White Pages of your telephone directory, or just "google" your county and "board of Supervisors." If your Registrar of Voters is appointed, s/he is responsible to the County Board of Supervisors. And they are responsible to you.
ACTION #3 Contact EVERY media outlet you can, DEMAND coverage of McPherson's machinations. BE OUTRAGED!! BE OUTRAGEOUS!
http://www.congress.org/congressorg/dbq/media/
Tell them they have a responsibility as journalists. Challenge them to live up to their mission. It's not too late to have the courage to make a difference. Remind them that a major reason they are losing readers and viewers is because they DON'T report the news! Bring to their attention, Thursday's piece by Bob Koehler: http://commonwonders.com/archives/col321.htm
ACTION #4 Activate the grassroots and netroots: tell your family, friends and neighbors
Expand your circle of influence: inform and arm ten of your fellow citizens with the information and tools provided here. Enlist their aid in protecting California election security.
Whoa! Surprising experience to be read while working. A draft of the CEPN report can be read at http://www.califelectprotect.net/
Update to add:
A Report from the CALIFORNIA ELECTION PROTECTION NETWORK
Background and talking points: (it's all summarized here, plenty to choose from, no waiting)
CEPN is a non-partisan organization of people from 17 CA counties and over 25 groups coming together to achieve election integrity goals. Posted at http://www.califelectprotect.net/home.html
Diebold in CA: Machinations Behind Closed Doors
November 21, 2005.
Sacramento. Today was an exhilarating day. Deja vu of the last Diebold hearing, this new attempt to certify Diebold wares once again raised the near-unanimous ire of concerned citizens. The passion and dedication of the people in attendance was palpable. To witness more than 125 citizens, journeying great distances--on short notice and on a short holiday week--who all came together to defend the integrity of our democratic processes, was to witness the real "Patriot Act."
Without the dedication and vigilance of these activists, other concerned citizens would never have known that behind closed doors, the machinery of the Secretary of Statešs office was in high gear ready to certify Diebold.
Testing Diebold
Diebold suffered some setbacks earlier this year trying to meet the new state requirement for a voter verified paper audit trail. In its initial test this summer, the AccuView printer attachment to the TSx model touch screen voting machine had a staggering 30% performance failure rate. Diebold made adjustments, resubmitted, and reportedly passed a second test in September, clearing the way for re-certifying the TSx machines in four counties where they've been suspended since spring 2004.
Test Results: Passing With a Weak Thumb's Up
California's official voting equipment certification tester, Steve Freeman, issued a slightly qualified "thumbs up" for Diebold. Freeman applied his stamp of approval despite the fact that he did not run tests on the specific security holes revealed by computer security experts Avi Rubin, Herbert Thompson and Harry Hursti, which Blackboxvoting.org later applied in demonstrations of undetected vote-switching conducted under simulated election conditions.
As one election official (who asked not to be identified) said of the Statešs passing grade on the testing results, "Isnšt it like examining a patient for small pox and proudly announcing that their teeth are clean?"
Aces Up Sleeves?
Jim March of Blackboxvoting.org provided a riveting and colorful overview of the various new ways recording and tabulation can be hacked on Diebold equipment. His gift for explaining technical intricacies kept the audience on the edge of their seats. After detailing uncorrected software and hardware defects in Diebold voting systems that remain standing invitations to vote fraud, March noted Diebold continued refusal to release its source code for testing, or to identify the authors responsible March concluded his remarks with this advice to public officials promoting the use of Diebold voting machines, "If you don't want to be accused of cheating at cards, don't let aces fall out of your sleeves at every step."
The Seven Reason NOT to Certify Diebold
Numerous members of the California Election Protection Network (CEPN) delivered spoken testimony. The CEPN also entered into the record their press advisory titled "Seven Reason NOT to Certify Diebold."
[See below]
SB370: Cart Before the Horse
Michelle Gabriel of the Wellstone Democratic Renewal Club's Voting Rights Task Force and CEPN commented that, given the recent passage of SB370 and the mandatory 1% precinct recount, the AVVPAT printouts will be used for recounts. (SB370 mandates that in the event of a recount, the recount is of the paper, not electronic record.)
Gabriel noted that no one has yet tested - under real life conditions - whether it is practical, or even possible to conduct an audit using Diebold's AccuView printer and its roller-fed, thermal-paper tape. Given that the Secretary of State publicly identified these concerns in editorials and opinions, it is of concern that they have not been tested.
Before the upcoming June primary, recount performance tests should be performed. If the equipment cannot perform the function for which it is intended, it violates the election code and should not be certified.
Kim Alexander of the California Voter Foundation called for testing this equipment for all its required tasks BEFORE certifying it, because the Secretary of Statešs Office has NO right to risk the security of our next election with untested election machines.
Surprising About-Face from Disability Rights Groups
In a surprise about-face, all of the disability groups represented at Monday's hearing went on record against certifying the Diebold equipment, stating that it simply does not meet their specific needs.
Over the past two years many groups representing disabled citizens have lobbied and litigated forcefully for the adoption of Diebold-type voting systems. There has been much speculation about the motives behind such pro-Diebold efforts, considering that the Diebold campaigning began AFTER Diebold made a six-figure contribution to the largest national association of the blind.
Disability Groups and HAVA
The reversal by disability rights groups at Monday's hearing is very significant. The most forceful influence driving county elections officials to purchase of DRE (touch screen) voting machines like the Diebold TsX has been the threat of lawsuits brought by the disabled against election officials resisting the switch to DRE voting systems.
There is a pervasive misconception, actively promoted by DRE vendors and supporters, that the Help America Vote Act (HAVA) requires touch screen (DRE) voting systems as the only suitable means to address disabled voting needs. HAVA merely requires that voting systems enable disabled persons to vote independently, and there are non-computerized voting solutions that meet this condition. [See http://www.votersunite.org/info/accessibility.asp]
Further, last year a federal court decision clearly stated that the rights of the disabled cannot come at the expense of the majority of voters. [See http://evotingcase.notlong.com]
HAVA: Use it or Lose it
The major threat driving voting system purchasing decisions has been the HAVA "Use it or Lose it" funding deadline, set for the stroke of midnight at the end of this year. County elections officials who have found the voting equipment options offered them unacceptable, given the confusion about which federal standards may eventually be required, wish to avoid hasty purchases they may later regret. Many would prefer to forego the one-time federal funding bonanza and wait for better voting systems to be developed under clear federal standards.
HAVA & DOJ Enforcement
But now a new pressure is being applied to force purchase decisions for DRE equipment. At the time of last summeršs second Carter-Baker Commission, which addressed the public's eroding confidence in our voting systems, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a statement announcing that state election departments that failed to make arrangements for equipment upgrades effective by Jan. 1, 2006 would be visited by Department of Justice (DOJ) investigators. Marin County election official Madelyn DeJusto recently said, "And when you get a visit from them [the DOJ] they don't go away."
Hold on HAVA
Megan Matson of Mainstreet Moms Operation Blue (MMOB) eloquently previewed a Hold on HAVA campaign, in solidarity with the National Alliance of County Officials (NACO). This national elections official organization seeks to extend the HAVA deadline for two years. In a recent impassioned plea to members of Congress (read into the record by CEPN member Sherry Reson) NACO explained that they have no "crystal ball" to see what equipment will be certified and asked for a two year extension. Further, the Election Assistance Commission--the four-person panel charged with supervising the enactment of HAVA--is months behind its own deadlines for setting these standards. [more below]
The No Hearing Hearing
Much has already been written about the peculiar nature of today's certification hearing [See, http://tinyurl.com/c6g4v ] The hastily assembled delegation of Election Division officials before whom the citizens spoke on Monday has no decision-making role. Those officers do not even have an advisory role in this certification decision.
Under former Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, there had been a Voting Systems and Procedures Panel expressly charged with advising the Secretary of State. No longer. Those sitting in chairs on stage Monday were props in a show of minimal compliance with the certification procedure's hearing requirement. Our good citizens who pleaded for election integrity can only hope that perhaps Secretary McPherson or someone he designates may possibly read and consider any of their remarks before issuing a decision on Diebold certification. California Sen. Koretz (Dem) is the first legislator to question this break with previously established protocol for seriously considering citizen comment. [See below]
Media Coverage of Today's Events?
Given the nearly total blackout in the mainstream press on questions raised by recent elections, citizen activists were heartened to see an unprecedented turnout by the news media for Monday's voting system certification hearing. Longtime Sacramento media consultant Cress Vellucci exclaimed, "I've never seen this much media show up for this kind of event." TV camera crews were dispatched by two local NPR television affiliates and Sacramento's Channel 3. Radio reporters from KQED, KPFA, KPFK and a CNN affiliate recorded and conducted interviews during the demonstration. Writers were assigned by the AP wire, Stockton Press, Oakland Tribune, Sacramento Bee, and Sacramento Reporter.
Where's the Media on Election Integrity and the GAO Report?
Curiously, to date, not a single news agency of national stature has even mentioned the highly critical 117-page report issued by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) of October 12, 2005, which catalogs widespread electronic voting failures and warns of continuing, unattended security risks in the nation's voting systems. [See, http://tinyurl.com/bv6f6 ]
New Opportunities for Coverage
The first articles breaking the events of earlier today side-stepped the issues of Diebold voting systems' insufficiencies and the company's history of election law violations, choosing instead to feature the State's contention that the systems have passed the requisite tests.
Where in the World is Bruce?
The integrity of California elections is now in the lap of Governor Schwarzenegger's appointed Secretary of State Bruce McPherson (Rep). He did not descend from his upstairs office to hear the testimony of citizens in the auditorium. But two others interested in his job--State Sen. Debra Bowen (Dem) and Forrest Hill (Grn) were both present and keenly attentive.
What's Next Behind Closed Doors? Good Night and Good Luck
There is a closed meeting next week in Sacramento, to be held at the Hyatt Regency on November 27-28.
The stated agenda is to discuss the conditions of certification and "best practices." Some of the invited officials are known to be those who have openly flouted election code and zealously supported relaxed election integrity standards. No one was invited from the California Election Protection Network, a non-partisan organization with representation of over 25 groups and 18 counties.
An election insider tells us that we will be blacklisted from participating in this summit. While we would like to believe that it is a misunderstanding only time will tell.
In the meantime, we do have rejection letters from Bruce McDannold of McPherson's office stating that we cannot attend, but that we may rest assured that our views will be represented. [See below] We wonder how Bruce McDannold can make that assurance. After reviewing the summit's agenda, we know there are three attendees, computer scientists, who share our concerns. But they speak from a narrow computer expert perspective -- and they don't speak for us or the the broad range of issues.
We Can Do It Right!
Democracy is at a critical juncture: At the November 27-28 Summit California will determine its future election practices for years to come, and attendance by our informed citizens is not only desirable, but necessary.
Seven Reasons NOT to Certify Diebold
1. The GEMS Defect
Reported by BOE Harris and Dr. Herbert Thompson, and independently confirmed by the security consultant firm Compuware on commission from the state of Ohio, the GEMS Defect concerns the central vote tabulating database that accumulates all the precinct and absentee votes for all Diebold optical scan and touch-screen voting systems. Despite assurances by Diebold, records obtained by Black Box Voting show that this issue has not been resolved in either California or Ohio, or apparently any of the other 1,200 jurisdictions that use Diebold. A critical set of Compuware documents confirming this was suppressed by Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell.
Votergate the Movie available for free download contains footage from a national TV broadcast of Bev Harris instructing Howard Dean how to hack GEMS and, without leaving a trace, alter vote tallies in under two minutes. Additional vulnerabilities have since been found and publicized at http://www.blackboxvoting.org.
"By successfully directing Canvas [commercial software] at the GEMS modem interface, the team was able to remotely upload, download and execute files with full system administrator privileges. All that was required was a valid phone number for the GEMS server."
--Trusted Agent Report, Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting System,January 20, 2004
Prepared for the Maryland General Assembly by: RABA Innovative Solution Cell (RiSC)
2. Stuffing the Electronic Ballot Box with Diebold Memory Cards
Finnish computer expert Harry Hursti, in cooperation with the elections administration of Leon County, Florida, has demonstrated in real-world voting conditions that executable code on the memory cards integral to the operation of Diebold optical scanners and touch screens can be quickly manipulated to change vote counts without detection. Brief account:
http://www.bbvforums.org/forums/messages/1954/5921.html?1117238594#POST6997
Full report: http://www.blackboxvoting.org/BBVreport.pdf
California's voting systems testing consultant Steve Freeman has confirmed that Diebold's proprietary programming language AccuBasic writes "report files used to configure AccuVote-OS and AccuVote-TS report contents and printing in precinct count mode. They are actually loaded into the memory cards for the AV-OS and AV-TS where their logic is executed.. . . The risk occurs in the opportunity to replace the verified file with some other .abo file . . or by replacing the current code with rewritten code performing other = operations."
Commenting on Freeman's report, Black Box Voting notes that it is possible to insert fraudulent code onto the memory cards that is date-specific, so that it will pass Logic & Accuracy testing pre- or post-election but trigger pre-planned manipulations on election day.
Invoking California Election Code 19202, Black Box Voting formally requested Secretary of State McPherson to conduct a replication of the Hursti memory card exploits for the Diebold touch screen and optical scan systems. Six months later, California still has not performed this test.
3. Inauditable Absentee Ballots on Diebold Optical Scanners
Just prior to the recent statewide election, technical experts assigned by the Libertarian Party to inspect Diebold systems in San Joaquin, Marin, and Alameda counties found that in the Diebold "central count" optical scanners, "a critical paper audit component is missing for all absentee and mail-in ballots, and also for recounts."
Diebold's central count scanners are unable to write backup data to memory storage, instead passing all vote counting directly to the notoriously insecure GEMS tabulator. No "poll tapes" or secondary source of data is retained, and there is no way to check whether the GEMS security defect was exploited without obtaining the GEMS vote data files. Diebold refuses to release these files.
4. The Secretary of State's Own Tech Advisors Are Warning Against Diebold
Below are excerpts from a technical review commissioned by Secretary McPherson concerning the AVVPAT printer module added to the TSx machines. The report, titled "Analysis of Volume Testing of the AccuVote TSx/AccuView" is available at
http://ss.ca.gov/elections/voting_systems/ vstaab_volume_test_report.pdf
p. 7: "... It is possible that these failures are a sign of a large number of other latent software defects." "... this issue warrants further investigation before any modified versions of the TSx are certified." "The fundamental barrier to analysis of these software errors is the lack of access to source code ... we have no way to perform such an independent evaluation. This is a very unsatisfying position to be in."
p. 8: "We believe these failures constitute one of the strongest arguments for the State of California to take possession of, or otherwise arrange for unfettered access to, the full source code and binary executables for all electronic voting machines." ... there is no way to know whether the defects have been fixed satisfactorily (as opposed to just hidden), or whether they represent symptoms of more serious architectural flaws, without access to the source."
5. The Federal and State Voting System Certification Process is Broken
Two testing labs in Huntsville, Alabama --Ciber Labs, run by Shawn Southworth, and a Wyle Labs office supervised by Jim Dearman--are responsible for repeatedly certifying defective voting machines that violate Federal Election Commission (FEC) standards.
The limited functionality testing performed by these federally contracted "independent testing authorities" (that derive at least a third of their funding directly from the voting system vendors they are inspecting) and by California's consultant Steve Freeman, does not test for the known security vulnerabilities of the Diebold voting systems, including Dr. Herbert Thompson's VBA script attack, and Hursti's electronic ballot box stuffing and memory card swapping techniques.
6. Diebold Software Comes with a Criminal Pedigree
Convicted Computer Embezzler Authored GEMS Software
Jeff Dean was Senior Vice-President of Global Election Systems when it was bought by Diebold in 2002. Even though he had been convicted of 23 counts of felony theft in the first degree, Jeff Dean was retained as a consultant by Diebold and was largely responsible for programming the optical scanning software now used in most of the United States.
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0312/S00191.htm
http://www.chuckherrin.com/HackthevoteFAQ.htm#how
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-8.pdf
Diebold consultant Jeff Dean was convicted of planting back doors in his software and using a "high degree of sophistication" to evade
detection over a period of 2 years.
http://www.chuckherrin.com/HackthevoteFAQ.htm#how
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/bbv_chapter-8.pdf
7. DIEBOLD CONTINUES TO PERJURE AND VIOLATE ELECTION LAWS
Records obtained by Black Box Voting show that Diebold executives lied to the Arizona Secretary of State, the Cuyahoga County Board of Elections, and to hundreds of elections officials throughout the U.S. about the existence of specific defects. Most famously of all, Diebold lied to the State of California in 2003 about illegally installing uncertified voting software in all 17 counties in which Diebold had contracts.
http://www.ss.ca.gov/elections/ks_dre_papers/diebold_report_april20_final.pdf
From the MMOB
Megan Matson at Mainstreet Moms Operation Blue (the MMOB) is turning her formidable attentions to the cause of election protection. Here is a preview of Hold On HAVA... a call to extend the HAVA deadline.
Did you know...the federal government is forcing county elections officials to purchase new and persistently flawed electronic voting machines by December 31st -- machines that many counties don't even want? If officials miss this deadline, they lose valuable Help America Vote Act (HAVA) funds, and will still need to meet the extensive HAVA requirements on their own dime.
Ask your Secretary of State, http://www.nass.org/...
the National Association of State Election Directors, http://www.nased.org/...
and the National Association of Secretaries of State http://www.nassorg/...
to join NACO http://www.naco.org/
in demanding a 2-year extension of the HAVA deadline from the federal government, when
Congress meets in December.
The federal government has failed to meet its own HAVA commitments for establishing testing standards. The vendors have failed every state-commissioned, independent test they've taken to date. The cost to taxpayers is high. We must allow our officials the time to insure the most basic security, reliability and transparency in how America counts her votes.
This is big. If you have even a small wedge of time, pick just one of the following and run with it: Fax or call your Secretary of State, the National Association of State Election Directors, and the National Association of Secretaries of State to join NACO in demanding a 2-year extension of the HAVA deadline.
If the HAVA deadline stands, there will be a forced rush to purchase this costly, complex, and inadequate technology. Voters and local election officials will be engaged in a giant "beta test" of these vendor's products on Election Day 2006, and the considerable HAVA funding will be gone.
Condemned in the new GAO report and in the bipartisan Carter/Baker Commission report, DRE voting (Direct Record Electronic) in particular has a proven 20% failure rate in the most recent state-commissioned independent test, and an "F" rating in the only two other state-commissioned independent tests. DRE touchscreen voting in particular is a consistently inferior technology taxpayers shouldn't have to pay for, and voters certainly shouldn't have to cast votes on.
Ask your Secretary of State, the National Association of State Election Directors, and the National SOS Association to join NACO in demanding a 2-year extension of the HAVA deadline.
Too much is at stake when America votes to rush our local officials into purchasing equipment they don't trust.
Thank you for supporting your state and local elections officials in their request to Congress for the time needed to insure secure, reliable and transparent elections.
The National Association of Counties (NACO) was created in 1935 when county officials wanted to have a strong voice in the nation's capital. More than six decades later, NACo continues to ensure that the nation's 3066 counties are heard and understood in the White House and the halls of Congress. NACO's membership totals more than 2,000 counties, representing over 80 percent of the nation's population. http://www.naco.org/
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES
October 20, 2005
Dear Member of Congress:
Before you conclude the first session of the 109th Congress, county officials across the nation urge you to attend to a critical piece of unfinished business that will protect and preserve the integrity of our voting process:
Fix the implementation timeline for the Help America Vote Act.
Many counties across the nation will be unable to comply with provisions of that law that are scheduled to take effect on January 1, 2006, because the federal government has failed to meet its own statutory deadlines for issuing standards for voting equipment - standards that have not been finished and to which no equipment has yet been tested or certified. In the absence of this certification, county officials can only gaze into a crystal ball and make predictions about which equipment will eventually meet the federal standards in the face of spiraling costs and threatened lawsuits in federal court.
The Election Assistance Commission has recognized the impossibility of this situation and stated it best in their Annual Reports for 2003 and 2004: 1/2The implications of these delays are likely to include continued problems with election equipment; other unresolved election administration issues such as voter verifiable paper audit; and the likely inability of States and local election jurisdictions to meet HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines.
Perhaps the most serious implication of the delayed EAC startup is the impact it will have on State procurement of new election equipment and the ability of some States and local election jurisdictions to meet HAVA requirements by statutory deadlines.
We urge you to provide a temporary moratorium on federal agency enforcement of the deadlines in the Help America Vote Act. This will also send a message to the federal courts to give the states and counties breathing room to make wise decisions based on guidance from the EAC - as was the intent of HAVA.
County officials appreciate your attention to this urgent matter. If you have any questions, please ask your staff to contact Alysoun McLaughlin, Associate Legislative Director, at 202-942-4254 or amclaughlin@naco.org
